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We propose a protocol for deterministic communication that does not make use of entanglement.
It exploits nonorthogonal states in a two-way quantum channel attaining significant improvement
of security and efficiency over already known cryptographic protocols. The presented scheme, be-
ing deterministic, can be devoted to direct communication as well as to key distribution, and its
experimental realization is feasible with present day technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Hk
In a recent paper Bostro¨m and Felbinger [1] presented
a scheme to have “Secure Deterministic Communication
using Entanglement”. The idea is an original revisiting of
the “Quantum Dense Coding” [2]. They called the pro-
tocol “Ping-Pong” (PP) for its peculiarity of a “forward
and backward” use of the quantum channel. With re-
spect to Bennett and Brassard’s scheme (BB84) [3], the
main advantage of PP is its deterministic nature, that
permits Quantum Direct Communication (QDC) as well
as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Unfortunately it
was proved to be not completely secure [4, 5].
We describe here a communication protocol that com-
bines the main advantages of PP and BB84, while avoid-
ing their drawbacks, and we termed it PP84 [6]. The
general idea is summarized in Fig.1. A character, tradi-
tionally called Bob, prepares a qubit in one of the four
randomly chosen states |0〉, |1〉 (eigenstates of Pauli op-
erator Z), |+〉, |−〉 (eigenstates of Pauli operator X),
and sends it to his counterpart Alice. With probability
(c) Alice measures the prepared state (control mode) or,
with probability (1 − c), she uses it to encode a bit (en-
coding mode). After that she will send the qubit back
to Bob. Encoding is represented by a transformation on
qubit state rather than by qubit state itself: identity op-
eration I encodes 0, while operation iY = ZX encodes
1. Notice that iY acts as a spin-flip on all the beginning
states:
iY (|0〉 , |1〉) = (− |1〉 , |0〉)
iY (|+〉 , |−〉) = (|−〉 ,− |+〉) (1)
In this way Alice does not need to know the incoming
state to perform the encoding. In turn Bob can easily
decode Alice’s message by measuring the qubit in the
same basis he prepared it. This feature makes the pro-
tocol deterministic: no qubits are discarded because of a
wrong choice of the basis. To make a QDC it suffices that
Alice performs transformations according to the message
she wants to send out, while for a QKD the sequence
of transformations will be random. Moreover the ab-
sence of any public discussion concerning qubit basis in
the encoding-decoding procedure gives an eavesdropper
(Eve) no classical information about qubit state, prevent-
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FIG. 1: PP84 scheme
ing powerful attacks based on this strategy.
To guarantee security of PP84, Alice has to measure
the qubit with a probability c 6= 0 by randomly choos-
ing a basis (Z or X), as in BB84. After that she will
send qubit back to Bob. He, after publicly declaring the
receipt of the qubit, measures it as exactly would do if
Alice had encoded it (actually, he doesn’t still know Al-
ice’s choice). At this point Alice reveals publicly whether
she measured (and in which basis) or not, and a public
debate on results is settled with Bob in the former case.
Notice that if Eve is not on the line a perfect “double”
correlation (on the forward and backward paths) of mea-
surement results must be found by legitimate users.
The “run-by-run” protocol just described realizes a
QDC, which is more demanding on security. QKD easily
follows from it by deferring all public discussions at the
end of the whole transmission.
Let us introduce the question of security of PP84 by
a simple eavesdropping strategy. Suppose Eve randomly
decides a basis, Z or X , along which performing projec-
tive measurements on the traveling qubit, both on for-
ward and backward path. She can guess the right basis
with probability 1/2, and in this case she is not revealed
at all. If otherwise Eve chooses the wrong basis she still
2has a probability of 50% to evade detection at point E1
and 50% at point E2 giving in the whole a 25% of pos-
sibility to evade detection. This means that Alice and
Bob’s double test reveals Eve with average probability
equal to: (0 + 3/4)/2 = 3/8 = 37.5%. Remarkably, this
value is greater than the one obtained in BB84 (25%) for
the same eavesdropping strategy. To extend the argu-
ment to general attacks we follow the line sketched in [7]
but with some relevant differences.
Given the four states prepared by Bob, and Eve’s an-
cillary states |ε〉, we can write the most general operation
Eve can do on traveling qubit as:
|0〉 |ε〉 → |0〉 |ε00〉+ |1〉 |ε01〉 =
√
F |0〉 |ε˜00〉+
√
D |1〉 |ε˜01〉
|1〉 |ε〉 → |0〉 |ε10〉+ |1〉 |ε11〉 =
√
D |0〉 |ε˜10〉+
√
F |1〉 |ε˜11〉
|+〉 |ε〉 → 1√
2
[|0〉 (|ε00〉+ |ε10〉) + |1〉 (|ε01〉+ |ε11〉)]
≡ |+〉 |ε++〉+ |−〉 |ε+−〉
|−〉 |ε〉 → 1√
2
[|0〉 (|ε00〉 − |ε10〉) + |1〉 (|ε01〉 − |ε11〉)]
≡ |+〉 |ε−+〉+ |−〉 |ε−−〉 (2)
Ancillary states are neither orthogonal nor normalized;
states with tilde are instead normalized. The following
conditions make the transformations (2) unitary:
〈ε00|ε00〉+ 〈ε01|ε01〉 ≡ F +D = 1
〈ε10|ε10〉+ 〈ε11|ε11〉 ≡ D + F = 1
〈ε00|ε10〉+ 〈ε01|ε11〉 = 0 (3)
We can set, without loss of generality: 〈ε00|ε01〉 =
〈ε10|ε11〉 = 〈ε00|ε10〉 = 〈ε01|ε11〉 = 0. Furthermore, we
specify the angles between nonorthogonal vectors as:
〈ε˜00|ε˜11〉 = cosx , 〈ε˜01|ε˜10〉 = cos y (4)
with 0 ≤ x , y ≤ pi/2. Here, we don’t fix values of the
parameters we introduced. In [7] symmetry arguments
lead to assume F = 〈ε00|ε00〉 = 〈ε++|ε++〉. This rea-
soning is not applicable in our case: the absence of a
classical discussion during the encoding-decoding proce-
dure prevents Eve from waiting for the basis revelation,
thus forcing her to break the symmetry by deciding the
measurement basis.
At point E2 Eve performs an attack similar to that at
point E1, but with fresh ancillae |η〉 (hence new param-
eters F ′ and D′),
|0〉 |η〉 →
√
F ′ |0〉 |η˜00〉+
√
D′ |1〉 |η˜01〉
|1〉 |η〉 →
√
D′ |0〉 |η˜10〉+
√
F ′ |1〉 |η˜11〉
|+〉 |η〉 → |+〉 |η++〉+ |−〉 |η+−〉
|−〉 |η〉 → |+〉 |η−+〉+ |−〉 |η−−〉 (5)
At the end of transmission Eve will measure ε and η ancil-
lae and, by comparing results, she will gain information.
This strategy represents the most general attack Eve can
perform in a single run, if we do not allow her to create
coherence in some way between forward and backward
paths; for this reason we term it “incoherent”, referring
to the other possibility as “coherent”. Within this kind
of attack we must recover the optimal measure Eve can
do i.e. we must maximize Alice and Eve’s mutual infor-
mation (IAE) minimizing detection probability (Pd).
From transformations (2) and conditions (3) we can
evaluate the probability that Eve is not detected in the
forward path, after her E1-attack:
Pnd(|0〉) = 〈ε00|ε00〉 = F (6)
Pnd(|1〉) = 〈ε11|ε11〉 = F
Pnd(|+〉) = 〈ε++|ε++〉 = (1/2) [1 + F cosx+D cos y]
Pnd(|−〉) = 〈ε−−|ε−−〉 = (1/2) [1 + F cosx+D cos y]
Similar arguments hold for the backward path, after
E2-attack, with primed parameters replacing not-primed
ones. The probability that Eve is not detected after a
whole run is then the product of the two partial probabil-
ities; by taking its complement we obtain the probability
to detect Eve. Averaging it over all input states we get:
Pd = (1/8){7− 4FF ′ − F cosx−D cos y − F ′ cosx′
−D′ cos y′ − FF ′ cosx cosx′ − FD′ cosx cos y′
−DF ′ cos y cosx′ −DD′ cos y cos y′} (7)
It is possible to show [8] that Pd takes the minimum
d ≡ minPd = [1− (1 + cosx) (1 + cosx′) /4] /2 (8)
for F = F ′ = 1; this condition represents the best Eve
can do to conceal her presence. The maximum value
d = 3/8 is obtained when x = x′ = pi/2, corresponding,
as we will see, to Eve’s maximum information.
If Alice and Bob are going to make a QDC we can eval-
uate the probability that Eve can steal n bits of full infor-
mation without being detected as (1−c)n/[1−c(1−d)]n.
It turns out, for example, that if c = 1/2 Eve has a proba-
bility of about 7.8% to successfully eavesdrop 1 byte (i.e.
8 bits) of full information and about 0.6% to eavesdrop 2
bytes. Increasing the value of c increases security of the
protocol, but at the expense of the transmission rate.
If instead Alice and Bob are going to make a QKD
then the argument is a little bit more complicated. To
evaluate IAE let us write Bob’s initial state as |Ψ〉 =∑
α=0,1 Cα |α〉. Now, suppose Alice performs identity be-
tween the two Eve’s attacks:
|Ψ〉 |ε〉 |η〉 E1→
∑
α
Cα
∑
β
|β〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉 I→ (9)
∑
α
Cα
∑
β
|β〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉 E2→
∑
α
Cα
∑
β,γ
|γ〉 |εαβ〉 |ηβγ〉
The ancillary states involved in this operation are:
|ε00, η00〉 , |ε00, η01〉 , |ε01, η10〉 , |ε01, η11〉
|ε10, η00〉 , |ε10, η01〉 , |ε11, η10〉 , |ε11, η11〉 (10)
3If, instead, Alice performs a flip we have:
|Ψ〉 |ε〉 |η〉 E1→
∑
α
Cα
∑
β
|β〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉 iY→
∑
α
Cα
∑
β
(−1)β+1 |β ⊕ 1〉 |εαβ〉 |η〉 E2→
∑
α
Cα
∑
β,γ
(−1)β+1 |γ〉 |εαβ〉
∣∣η(β⊕1)γ〉 (11)
and ancillary states involved are:
|ε00, η10〉 , |ε00, η11〉 , |ε01, η00〉 , |ε01, η01〉
|ε10, η10〉 , |ε10, η11〉 , |ε11, η00〉 , |ε11, η01〉 (12)
To acquire information from states (10) and (12) Eve
must measure both her ancillae. Keeping in mind or-
thogonality relations (3) and following, we see that the
best way to do that is to distinguish orthogonal subspaces
before, and then nonorthogonal states within them. The
probability to correctly distinguish between two states
with scalar product cosx is (1 + sinx) /2 [9]. Observing
states (10) and (12) we can notice that if Eve mistakes
to identify her first ancilla (ε states) then she guesses
wrong Alice’s operation, since she flips from states (10)
to (12) or viceversa. The same is true if she guesses right
ε state but mistakes η state. Nevertheless, if she mistakes
twice, then with the first error she misinterprets (10) with
(12) and with the second error she compensates the first,
eventually guessing right Alice’s operation. This lead to a
lengthy expression of IAE as a function of the six param-
eters describing ancillae states, but it can be simplified
recalling that Eve wants to keep the Pd as low as possi-
ble, and so condition F = F ′ = 1 applies. In this case
Eve’s strategy is optimal and IAE becomes:
IAE = 1− h [(1 + sinx sinx′) /2] (13)
where h(·) indicates the Shannon binary entropy [10].
We are now in the position to compare relevant quan-
tities we have calculated, in particular Eq.(8) for Pd and
Eq.(13) for IAE . Unfortunately, both equations are func-
tions of x and x′ thus preventing us to write IAE as a
function of Pd. However, the following lemma holds:
Lemma.The optimal Eve incoherent attack consists in
a balanced one for which x = x′.
This lemma can be justified with the following qualita-
tive argument [8]. The orthogonality Eve imposes on her
ancillae is somewhat related to the information she can
extract from the qubit: the more orthogonal they are,
the higher is the information gained. If she sets x > x′,
the ancillae ε will be more orthogonal than ancillae η,
and this entails a loss of information when going from
the forward to the backward path. If she sets x < x′ we
can argue the reverse.
The above lemma allows us to write Pd (8) as:
d = (1/2)− (1/8) (1 + cosx)2 (14)
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FIG. 2: PP84 Security: Information vs Detection Proba-
bility. The descent curve represents Alice and Bob mutual
information IAB . The crescent curves represent Alice and
Eve mutual informations (IAE dashed line, I
bound
AE solid line).
By inverting this relation and substituting it into Eq.(13)
we can express the information IAE as function of Pd:
IAE = 1− h
{[
2− (2
√
1− 2d− 1)2
]/
2
}
(15)
It is easy to see that the maximum of information, IAE =
1, corresponds to a detection probability d = 37.5%. This
implies that projective attacks described above are a kind
of optimal incoherent attacks. IAE as a function of Pd
is shown in Fig.2. For a QKD to be secure a comparison
between Alice and Eve’s mutual information and Alice
and Bob’s one must be settled; we must then evaluate
the amount of information Bob has access to. Also in
these calculations we must set F = F ′ = 1, because Bob
receives a perturbed state according to Eve’s choice of
minimizing the Pd. So, with this condition, the proba-
bility that Bob makes a right guess on Alice’s transfor-
mation after preparing |+〉 or |−〉, and Eve measures in
the basis |ε0,1〉 , |η0,1〉, is P0,1 = (1 + cosx cos x′) /2. The
probability that Bob makes a right guess on Alice’s trans-
formation, after preparing the same states and Eve mea-
sures in the basis |ε+,−〉 , |η+,−〉 is P+,− = 1. Analogous
results hold if Bob prepares states |0〉 or |1〉. Averaging
the information corresponding to P0,1 and to P+,−, and
using the above Lemma we get:
IAB = 1− (1/2)h
[(
1 + cos2 x
)
/2
]
(16)
Eq.(16) can be written as function of Pd by inverting,
as for IAE , Eq.(14). The result is shown in Fig.2. We
notice that minimum Bob’s information is 1/2, because
in half cases Eve doesn’t perturb the channel at all. Nev-
ertheless, if we had used symmetry conditions discussed
after Eq.(4) we would have obtained IAE going to zero.
The intersection of IAB and IAE determines the safety of
4the protocol for QKD. It results that the PP84 is secure
against a general incoherent attack provided d <∼ 23%.
So far we have considered incoherent attacks and eval-
uated relevant quantities like detection probability, Eve’s
information and Bob’s information. What is about co-
herent attacks? The most general coherent attack can be
written as a transformation on 64 states of the form:
|0〉 |ε00〉 |η〉 → |0〉 [|ε00〉 |η000000〉+ |ε01〉 |η001000〉
+ |ε10〉 |η010000〉+ |ε11〉 |η011000〉] +
+ |1〉 [|ε00〉 |η100000〉+ |ε01〉 |η101000〉
+ |ε10〉 |η110000〉+ |ε11〉 |η111000〉]
|1〉|ε00〉|η〉 → . . .
... (17)
because the attack at point E2 includes also the resulting
state of the first ancillae. This can create coherence be-
tween forward path and backward one, and Eve can take
advantage of it. Despite of that the most general expres-
sion for detection probability remains the one found for
incoherent attacks, given by Eq.(14), because it is ob-
tained when Alice decides to measure, and her measure
breaks any coherence Eve could have created. Moreover,
we notice that the first (“translucid” [11]) attack at point
E1 is the most general Eve can perform on the forward
path, and so it must be the same for any kind of com-
plete attack. This arguments permit us to bound the
information Eve can acquire in any attack, coherent or
not. We simply put together a Pd equal to d and a value
for IAE equal to the one Eve would obtain by setting
x′ = pi/2 in Eq.(13): IboundAE = 1 − h[(1 + sinx)/2]. It
is clear that we have overestimated Eve’s potential infor-
mation gain or, the same, underestimated Pd. Also this
result is shown in Fig.2. We obtain in this way the very
lower bound for security of PP84, namely d <∼ 18%. No-
tice that it is still greater than the one found in similar
circumstances (individual attacks on a lossless channel)
for BB84 (d <∼ 15%) [7]. We believe that these results,
together with the introductory remarks on attacks based
on classical information exchange during the encoding-
decoding procedure, demonstrate the safety of PP84.
We would also like to briefly describe the behavior of
PP84 when losses are present on the quantum channel.
Two aspects of this question must be addressed: security
against losses-based attacks and efficiency of transmis-
sion. As far as the former is concerned the risk is that
an almighty Eve could substitute an imperfect channel
with a perfect one and conceal her attacks behind losses
interpreted as natural by Alice and Bob. This possibility
exploits the lack of symmetry of Alice control ([5], [12]),
and is not effective in our case. We have also consid-
ered more subtle attacks based on a kind of “quantum
nondemolition strategy” by Eve, but Alice and Bob can
always detect them by comparing losses rate pertaining
to control mode runs and encoding mode ones.
As far as efficiency of transmission is concerned the im-
plicit assumption is that losses are not due to an eaves-
dropper, but only to an imperfect channel. Accord-
ingly to Ref.[13] the theoretical efficiency of a crypto-
graphic protocol for QKD is given by the formula E =
bs/ (qt + bt), where bs is the expected number of secret
bits received by Bob, qt is the number of transmitted
qubits on the quantum channel, and bt is the number
of transmitted bits on the classical channel. Since in
PP84 no classical information is needed in the encoding-
decoding procedure we have bt = 0, that entails E = 1
(while for BB84 E = 1/4). As far as practical efficiency
is concerned we refer to [14]. In our protocol a qubit,
represented for instance by the polarization of a photon,
is traveling for a distance 2L, being L the separation
between Alice and Bob. If P is the probability that a
photon is transmitted over the distance L, we have a to-
tal probability P2 to transmit it over 2L. The practical
efficiency can then be evaluated as E ′ = EP2. For BB84
the photon only travel for a distance L, thus E ′ = P/4.
Comparing the two protocols, we obtain that if P ≥ 25%
then the most efficient scheme is just the PP84.
In conclusion, we have presented a cryptographic pro-
tocol which embeds peculiarities of BB84 and PP proto-
cols, allowing direct communication as well as key dis-
tribution. It has been proved asymptotically secure in
the former case and secure against general attacks in the
latter case, admitting a greater quantum bit error rate
with respect to other known protocols. It is more efficient
than other schemes when losses are taken into account,
whilst allowing easier experimental realization.
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